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ABSTRACT: Marya Schechtman has given us reasons to think that there are different 
questions that compose personal identity. On the one hand, there is the question of 
reidentification, which concerns what makes a person the same person through different 
time-slices. On the other hand, there is the question of characterization, which concerns the 
actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, etc. that we take to be 
attributable to a person over time. While leaving the former question for another work, 
Schechtman answers the latter question by proposing what she terms the narrative self-
constitution view, whereby Schechtman claims that we account for intuitive features (moral 
responsibility, survival, compensation, and self-interested concern) of characterization 
through narratives. Still, merely having a narrative is not enough. In order to live the life of a 
person, an agent’s narrative must sync with the narrative told about him/her in community. 
This paper, while in full agreement with Schechtman’s claim regarding narratives and their 
ability to explain the intuitive features that regard the question of characterization, puts 
pressure on the latter claim. I argue that a person’s narrative is not merely one that synchs 
with the narrative told in community, but one that is determined by the person’s community. 
In focusing on Schechtman’s second claim, I appeal to the Akan conception of personhood, 
showing that the community sets the parameters of personal identity, and by body politics and 
conferring social recognition, determines the traits that we take to be attributed to a given 
person over time. 
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Marya Schechtman has given us a very rich conception of the self that she takes to 
answer a fundamental question of personal identity, namely how an individual can be 
categorized as the same person, as opposed to the question regarding what makes a 
person the same persisting or perduring person at different times. According to 
Schechtman this question, termed the characterization question, asks “which actions, 
experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, and so on…are to be attributed 
to a given person” (Schechtman 1996, 73). Schechtman answers this question by 
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arguing that “a person creates his [or her] identity by forming an autobiographical 
narrative—a story of his [or her] life” (Schechtman 1996, 93). One of the biggest 
reasons why this conception is so rich is because it accounts for the social nature of 
personal identity. She tells us that “an individual’s self-narrative must conform in 
certain crucial respects to the narrative others tell of his [or her] life” (Schechtman 
1996, 93). In short, Schechtman tells us that an individual’s narrative must synch-up 
with the community’s narrative about the individual. Still, it appears to me that 
Schechtman’s idea does not go far enough in reporting the social nature of individual 
identity. Schechtman’s theory promotes a narrative identity constructed by the person 
whose life is narrated, without being either directed or determined, which is to say 
strongly influenced, by his/her community (Schechtman 1996, 111). In so doing, I 
believe that Schechtman’s view misses the strength of how communities are 
responsible for the parameters that our identities take and how much weight 
communities have on our self-images, such that forming identities is impossible 
without communities directing and determining the types of identities formed. In 
short, Schechtman’s view falls short of appreciating how communities are responsible 
for our ability to be categorized as the same person.  
In this paper I would like to elucidate Schechtman’s view, raising questions about 
it insofar as it lacks a full appreciation for the social nature of personal identity. In so 
doing, I would like to introduce a conception of personhood that receives very little 
attention in debates on personal identity in western philosophy, namely the Akan 
conception of personhood. In introducing this conception, I look at two Ghanaian-
born thinkers, Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu, both of whom have written 
extensively on the Akan conception of personhood. Using Wiredu’s account, I argue 
that the Akan conception of personhood shows us the full weight that our 
communities have on shaping our identities. The fundamental question guiding this 
work is: what does our communities have to do with how we are categorized? 
Ultimately, what I argue is that who we are, which is to say how we are categorized 
(to use Schechtman’s division), is more strongly connected with our communities 
than Schechtman’s view reports. I would now like to begin with an elucidation of 
Schechtman’s view. 
 
1. THE NARRATIVE SELF-CONSTITUTION VIEW 
 
Schechtman employs her narrative theory in order to “explain our intuitions about the 
relation between personal identity and survival, moral responsibility, self-interested 
concern, and compensation” that cannot be explained by either reductionist 
psychological continuity theories or reductionist bodily continuity theories 
(Schechtman 1996, 1). Schechtman thinks that people have strongly held ordinary 
opinions about these “four features” of characterization in relation to personal 
identity, and thus that they must be taken into account by complete explanations of 
personal identity. On Schechtman’s view, both sets of reductionist theories fail 
insofar as they attempt to answer the question of how persons should be categorized 
as the same person by answering how persons reidentify as the same person. For 
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example, reductionist reidentification theorists will answer the question about when 
someone is moral responsibility for some action by asserting that a person is morally 
responsible for some action that occurred at t1 only if he/she is identical in the present 
(at t2) with that person who performed the action at t1. However, “these 
‘reidentification theorists’ fail to appreciate the boundaries of this [reidentification] 
question” (Schechtman 1996, 2). Questions about characterization and those of 
reidentification are thought to be answerable by the same theory. “As a result 
considerations linked to the categorization question creep into their investigation and 
are used (inappropriately) to guide their formulation of reidentification criteria, which 
undermines their project…at its very foundations” (Schechtman 1996, 2). These 
theorists mistakenly think that their theories will account for the four features as 
reidentification theories because their theories purport to define identity and because 
identity is linked to the four features. Essentially, these theorists fail to recognize that 
the issues and questions of personal identity are not monolithic; there are two 
different issues at play in personal identity, namely the issue of what is necessary to 
have the same person at two time-slices and the issue of the four features. The former 
relates to the reidentification question, while the latter relates to the categorization 
question. On Schechtman’s view, answering one question will not address issues 
relating to the other question.1 
Now, Schechtman thinks that the two sets of reductionist theories fail to account 
for the four features in different ways. Schechtman thinks that even though theories 
concerning the continuity of bodies purport to answer the reidentification question, it 
as counterintuitive to think that bodily continuity theories account for the four 
features (Schechtman 1996, 67). Schechtman tells us that it seems intuitive to think 
that bodily continuity tells us something about identity, insofar as: “Evidence that the 
present human body is the same as the past one is thus implicitly accepted as 
evidence that the present person is the same as the past one” (Schechtman 1996, 13). 
However, in addition to concerns about what accounts for the continuation of our 
bodies into future times, we have practical concerns that a psychological theory 
appears more suitable to account for. So, let’s take two individuals, Maria and Jane, 
and let us say that Maria performed some task for which she is to be compensated. 
Now, let us say that the day before Maria is to be compensated her psyche is placed 
into Jane’s body and Jane’s psyche into Maria’s body. Schechtman thinks that we 
would intuitively think that the body with Maria’s psyche should be the one that is 
compensated for performing the task, not the body that actually performed the task. 
Thus, in Schechtman’s view, we intuitively think that psychological continuity 
theories are better equipped to account for the four features. 
Though it might appear that psychological continuity theories are better equipped 
to account for the four features, Schechtman thinks that they fail to account for the 
four features. Schechtman reasons that they are “unable to explain the importance we 
attach to identity…” (Schechtman 1996, 52). Schechtman terms this failure the 
                                                
1 It is important to note that Schechtman is not committed to the view that the two questions are 
unrelated. Schechtman provides evidence for this note on page 68 of The Constitution of Selves. 
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“extreme claim.” The first premise of the extreme claim is that “the four features 
require numerical identity—qualitative similarity will not hold” (Schechtman 1996, 
52). What Schechtman has in mind here is that the four features must refer to the 
same person from the past to the future, and not a future person who is similar to the 
person of the past. The second premise of the extreme claim states that “the 
psychological continuity theory collapses the distinction between someone being me 
and someone being like me—that all identity amounts to on this view is psychological 
similarity between distinct individuals” (Schechtman 1996, 53). Schechtman thinks 
that psychological continuity theories can only account for personal identity by 
relational parts that are both temporary and distinct, such that a person at one time (t1) 
is only like (because he/she is in some way distinct from) a person at another time 
(t2). Psychological continuity theorists cannot produce a theory that allows for the 
numerical identity of a person at t1 and t2, only a qualitative similarity between the 
two. The conclusion of the extreme claim follows naturally from these two premises:  
 
If the relation of qualitative similarity between the psychological lives of distinct 
individuals is insufficient to underlie the four features, and if the psychological continuity 
theory provides a definition of identity according to which all it is for some future person 
to be me is for that person to have a psychological life qualitatively like mine, then the 
psychological continuity theory obviously fails to account for the importance of identity 
(Schechtman 1996, 54).  
 
How this fails to account for the importance that we attach to identity is that we 
all think it is the same person who must be compensated or held morally responsible 
for some action; it is the same self that we are concerned about; and it is the same self 
that we think must survive when we talk about personal identity. Why would 
someone be responsible for the action of someone who he/she is like? Or, why would 
someone be concerned (in the way that we are concerned with ourselves) for someone 
that he/she is merely like? As such, Schechtman thinks it fitting to conclude that both 
bodily and psychological continuity theories that purport to answer the 
reidentification question are insufficient to account for our intuitions about these four 
features, which are largely what makes the question of personal identity relevant, and 
which are accounted for by answering a question that is different in nature—namely 
the characterization question.  
As stated in the introduction, the characterization question asks which “actions, 
experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, and so on…are to be attributed 
to a given person” (Schechtman 1996, 73). The theorist who attempts to answer the 
characterization question gives an account of “which characteristics are truly those of 
some person…” (Schechtman 1996, 73). The characterization question is markedly 
different from the reidentification question insofar as the latter involves a logical 
relation of identity (or similitude in the case of what these theories are actually able to 
accomplish) in some person over time, while the former asks what psychical 
properties most characterize some person over time. Schechtman thinks that the four 
features can be accounted for when we engage the former question, and her answer to 
 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016)  BARNES 
5 
the former question is that we should think of personal identity in terms of a narrative. 
Schechtman titles this view the narrative self-constitution view.  
For Schechtman, personal identity is intimately linked to situating biological 
movements in a context that makes bodily movements more than simply mechanical 
or biological responses—they are actions. These actions take on a particular linear 
organization, or more explicitly a narrative. When I act, I take myself to be the 
experiencing subject, which is to say that I take myself to be an agent. Schechtman 
tells us that: “Perhaps the most salient feature of narrative form in general is that the 
individual incidents and episodes in a narrative take their meaning from the broader 
context of the story in which they occur” (Schechtman 1996, 96). It is only insofar as 
the movements (incidents and episodes) occur in the context of a narrative that they 
become meaningful. Thus, in order to explain an episode such as me reaching for a 
bottle of water, it must be understood that I am thirsty; and, in order to explain my 
being thirsty, it must be understood that I have just run five miles. Present episodes of 
experience are explained by past episodes. 
Episodes of experience that get organized into a narrative are not merely 
explained by past episodes, but project into the future. What this means is that current 
episodes of experience are also explained by anticipated episodes. For example, I 
stated that in order to explain the bottle-reaching episode one must understand the 
context in which the bottle-reaching episode occurred, namely my being thirsty, and 
that my being thirsty is situated in the context of my having just run five miles. Now, 
one might say that in order to explain the five mile-running episode one needs to 
understand that I desire and anticipate winning a gold medal in the Olympic Games as 
a successful track-and-field star. Thus, I not only understand my past actions in a 
particular context, but I extend my narrative to anticipated future occurrences. In 
short, the narrative, as a set of linearly organized episodes, is not closed. Thus, 
Schechtman tells us that: “At the core of this view is the assertion that individuals 
constitute themselves as persons by coming to think of themselves as persisting 
subjects who have had experiences in the past and will continue to have experiences 
in the future, taking certain experiences as theirs. Some, but not all, individuals weave 
stories of their lives, and it is their doing so which makes them persons” (Schechtman 
1996, 94).  
The particular content of an agent’s narrative is what constitutes the 
characterization portion of personal identity. And with regard to this content, nothing 
that I conceptualize as a part of the content that makes up my identity occurs apart 
from the context of my story or narrative. When I speak about my life as a narrative, I 
am not speaking about episodes disconnected from my narrative. Thus, an event such 
as walking to the grocery store must refer to prior and future anticipated episodes as 
contexts in order to be conceptualized as occurring in my narrative. And when we 
speak about my self-conception as a narrative, we cannot be referring to episodes in 
isolation or detached from it. 
One must take care to notice how this theory provides an account of the four 
features. For the sake of time, let us look at compensation and self-interested concern. 
Beginning with the latter, we can acknowledge that “what makes a particular 
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anticipation of the future a part of someone’s narrative is precisely the influence it has 
on the character of his present experience” (Schechtman 1996, 154-155). My desire to 
win a gold metal at the Olympic Games is a concern that has a direct bearing on my 
present psychological state. I worry about my future self, get excited in the present 
because of the anticipated future experiences and successes, and it is this worry and 
excitement—this concern—that motivates present action. Now certainly it is not 
simply this event that gives me worries and excitement, but the entirety of my future 
that I am concerned with, insofar as the Olympic games are not the only things in the 
future that concern me. By the time that I am concerned about this event in my 
narrative, there are innumerable anticipated events pressing me, such that I am 
concerned about the quality of my future as a whole, and not simply the individual 
future (and present) events that shape my present psychological state.  
“The concept of compensation is closely tied to that of self-interested concern—it 
is because we care about what our futures will be like that the promise of forthcoming 
benefits can make up for present difficulties” (Schechtman 1996, 157). Schechtman’s 
theory is able to account for compensation (like self-interested concern) because it is 
able to explain present psychological states by appeal to future anticipations and 
rewards (or fears). These future states explain who we are, and thus this theory about 
who we are naturally accounts for them. 
What has just been discussed refers to one major element of Schechtman’s theory, 
namely that individuals become persons by creating narratives. I am in complete 
agreement with this element of Schechtman’s theory. “The Second [major element] is 
a set of limitations on the form of an identity-constituting narrative” (Schechtman 
1996, 95). In order to understand Schechtman’s narrative view, we cannot simply 
think it divorced from one’s community. In fact, I think that this is one of the most 
impressive aspects of the theory. Schechtman tells us that: “A view that held that any 
narrative self-conception was identity-constituting would be committed to the 
obviously false claim that persons cannot be mistaken about themselves” 
(Schechtman 1996, 94). There are particular constraints on a narrative that a person 
can have. One of these constraints is that the person’s narrative must match the 
narrative of the person that is told by his/her community; the two narratives must be 
in synch. Thus, I cannot construct a narrative as a rich and famous professional 
athlete when I am a mere gas-station attendant. My community must be able to affirm 
the narrative that I take to be mine. Schechtman’s essential argument, as it relates to 
the social nature of personal identity, is that a person’s narrative must be in synch 
with his/her community’s understanding of his/her narrative because he/she must be 
able to live a life of a person. The life of a person necessarily includes social 
interactions and engagements, moral expectations, and future planning, which 
Schechtman thinks possible only if the community and the narrator have the same (or 
very similar) conceptions of the person’s experiences. If I attempt to narrate my life 
as a rich and famous professional athlete when my community understands my 
narrative to be a gas-station attendant’s, then I must do so in isolation from my 
community, particularly when I can only live this life by commanding the respect, 
signing the contracts, and being compensated as a professional athlete. Insofar as it 
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takes engagements with a community to do these things as a person would, my 
community must also understand my narrative to be that of a rich and famous 
professional athlete. This synching is necessary if I am to live among them. Living a 
social life, or the life of a person, depends on the synchronization of the narrative of 
the individual who identifies personally with the narrative of his/her social 
community. As such, a person cannot adopt any narrative or any self-concept.  
Thus, Schechtman gives us two basic sets of intuitions that lead to the narrative 
self-constitution view. She tells us “first that in order to be a person one needs a 
particular kind of subjectivity and orientation towards one’s life, and second, that in 
order to be a person one’s self-conception must cohere with what might be called the 
‘objective’ account of her life—roughly the story that those around her would tell” 
(Schechtman 1996, 95). Still, one might think that there is a deeper connection 
between these two sets of intuitions. One might ask how the community that one’s 
narrative must synch up with confines, sets the parameters for, and ultimately defines 
the possibilities of the narrative that one is able to take. Let us say that we have a 
person who is very much committed to gender equality. From where did this 
commitment derive? What social structures must be present in order for one to have a 
narrative that accords to any particular narrative? Further, what is the role of the body 
in the process of narrative-construction? If we say that the particular body of a person 
plays a role in the narrative that he/she constructs, and we affirm that a community’s 
politics places a value upon that body, then we must affirm that the community’s 
valuation of the body affects the narrative that that person can/will construct. For 
example, what happens when one’s body is colored or gendered? How does body-
politics affect narrative-construction? Still further, what affect does a community 
have on a person’s motivations to construct their identities in certain sorts of ways?  
Given these questions, I argue that Schechtman does not go far enough in 
elucidating the social nature of the characterization portion of personal identity. I 
question whether there might be more than simply a synchronization of a person’s 
narrative and the narrative told about the person by his/her community. In what 
follows I argue that a person’s narrative is not merely one that must be in synch with 
the one told in community, but also one that is determined by the community. By 
appealing to the Akan conception of personhood, I show that the community sets the 
parameters of personal identity, and by body-politics and social recognition, the 
community determines what characteristics a person can/will take.  
 
2. THE AKAN CONCEPTION OF PERSONHOOD 
 
The Akan conception of personhood is a very complicated and contentious 
conception that is far from settled among philosophers. Insofar as I do not want to 
leave the reader with the idea that there is a singular understanding of the conception, 
I would like to elucidate the Akan conception of personhood through two Ghanaian 
philosophers, Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu. Both Gyekye and Wiredu have 
radically different views on the Akan conception of personhood. My argument is that 
if we take Wiredu’s understanding seriously, then we can begin to more fully 
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appreciate the social nature of personal identity insofar as it relates to the 
categorization question. As such, I will elucidate the Akan conception of the human 
being, which is a composite of three essential elements. Afterwards, I will introduce 
Wiredu’s argument that personhood is to be understood separately from humanity as 
an achievement in community that human beings strive towards. For completeness, I 
will follow this introduction with a brief illustration of Gyekye’s response to this 
argument, and then Wiredu’s rejoinder to Gyekye. This will lead me to my ultimate 
goal, which is to illustrate just how looking at personal identity through the Akan 
gives us a deeper appreciation of the social nature of personal identity as it relates to 
the characterization question. 
With regard to the human being, both thinkers agree that for the Akan the human 
being is composed of three principle parts, ōkra (which can be understood as the life-
spark of a living organism, or that which answers why one thing is alive and another 
thing is not), sunsum (the character, or “that which is responsible for the unique 
personal presence that an individual has”) (Wiredu 1992a, 112), and honam (the body 
of the organism). While Gyekye largely remains silent on the divisions of the honam, 
Wiredu points out that the honam is in part composed of the mogya (blood). For 
Wiredu, the mogya plays a key role in conveying the social nature of the human, even 
apart from the particular conception of personhood that Wiredu attributes to the 
Akan. As stated, these understandings diverge quite a bit. Still, engaging both 
thinkers’ understandings will give a richer notion of each conception. 
For Wiredu and Gyekye, the ōkra is what is thought to be the life-spark of the 
human being. Both thinkers take the ōkra to be an essential part of the human being 
that functions (among other things) to explain the difference between living and non-
living beings. Still, for both thinkers the term unfolds in different ways, which is to 
say that Wiredu and Gyekye differ on the ontology of the ōkra. Gyekye models the 
ōkra on Western conceptions of the soul, while Wiredu cautions us not to link the 
ōkra too closely with Western conceptions, insofar as Western conceptions of the 
soul (on Wiredu’s account) tend to be loaded with components such as the mind, 
character, and immateriality.  
With regard to the ōkra, Wiredu tells us that: “There is, most visibly, the 
assemblage of flesh and bones that form the body. But, reason the Akans, something 
must make the difference between a dead, inert body, and a living one. This they 
attribute to an entity called okra, which they consider an actual particle of the 
supreme being” (Wiredu 1997, 48). At first blush, this sounds a bit like Aristotle, who 
argued that the soul, which one might take to be closest to the Akan conception of 
ōkra, is the first-principle of a natural body that has life potentially (Aristotle On the 
Soul, Book II, 412a). Yet, one can see the connection between ōkra and some divinity 
or supernatural being or substance. Whereas Aristotle could explain the principle that 
separates a living body from a dead or homonymous body by appeal to nature, the 
Akan, on Wiredu’s reading, seem to understand the principle as essentially connected 
to divinity. Further, Aristotle seems to promote the idea that thought is a function of 
the human soul, perhaps making the soul more than just a “principle” that explains 
the living-state of a particular being with a particular constitution (Aristotle On the 
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Soul, Book III, 427a-435b). For the Akan, ōkra is not the housing-place of the 
adwene, which Wiredu takes to be a capacity for some body to think thoughts, feel 
emotions, etc. (Wiredu 1997, 48). 
Now, for Wiredu, the ōkra is what grounds the basic equality of all human beings. 
Wiredu tells us that: “In virtue of that element [the ōkra], absolutely everyone, 
regardless of race, gender, or achievement is entitled to a certain degree of respect 
and consideration” (Wiredu 1992a, 112). And because such a spark is divine, it seems 
to promote the idea that humans are superior to other living things. Still, one may 
wonder whether the term is meant to explain the distinction between living and non-
living things, or merely a particular spark that separates human life from all other 
living things? Both Wiredu and Gyekye seem to equivocate on this point. Both 
theorists seem to offer an explanation of the term insofar as it answers the question, 
“why is X alive?” Still, both seem to link this principle to humanity’s basic equality. 
Surely they are not arguing that all living things are equal and deserve equal treatment 
based on their having this divine spark that explains their being alive, only humans. 
However, if ōkra is what explains life generally, then either all living things must be 
equal, or merely having an ōkra does not make all humans equal.  
Leaving this point aside, one is licensed to infer that personal identity is not a 
result of having an ōkra. One’s identity could not be defined by what makes him/her 
equal to either all other humans or living things. Thus, we must think of ōkra, as it 
relates to personal identity, as being a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
having an identity. As such, one’s character and characteristics, which seems (at least 
on Schechtman’s view) to be inextricably linked to personal identity, cannot be parts 
of ōkra.  
Gyekye diverges from Wiredu’s interpretation of the essential nature of the ōkra. 
He thinks that the Akan conception of the ōkra is closer to a traditional Western 
conception of the soul than does Wiredu. Gyekye shares Wiredu’s interpretation of 
the ōkra as a divine spark, and like Wiredu Gyekye argues that this divine spark 
makes all human beings equal to each other. However, on Gyekye’s interpretation, 
the immaterial ōkra encompasses both the character (the sumsum) and the mind (the 
adwene) of the individual. When speaking about the relationship between the ōkra 
and the sumsum, Gyekye, perhaps with Leibniz in mind, tells us that “given x and y, if 
whatever is asserted of x can be asserted of y, then x can be said to be identical with y. 
If there is at least one characteristic that x has but y does not, then x and y are not 
identical” (Gyekye 1998, 63). Gyekye goes on to tell us that the sumsum is not the 
ōkra, yet: “The sumsum may, more accurately, be characterized as a part––the active 
part––of the ōkra (soul)” (Gyekye 1998, 63). The character traits and characteristics 
that make up personal identity are the active parts of the ōkra, with the passive part of 
the ōkra perhaps being merely the potential to actualize certain traits, which he could 
then rely on to ground the basic equality of all persons (if he takes the ōkra to be what 
explains human life specifically). Gyekye links a human’s personal identity to the 
ōkra by the sumsum’s being a part of the okra. Gyekye tells us that: “Personality and 
character dispositions of a person are the function of the sumsum. The sumsum 
appears to be the source of dynamism of a person, the active part or force of the 
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human psychological system…” (Gyekye 1998, 63). Gyekye is then able to conclude 
that one’s individuality is both located in the ōkra, and that individuality is not lost 
after death, insofar as the sumsum is within the ōkra, and the ōkra is immaterial and 
indestructible.2 As such, Gyekye’s view of personal identity needs to go no further. 
Personal identity is given to the human when a divine being places his/her ōkra 
within him/her. For Gyekye: “The ōkra…is the principle of life of a person and the 
embodiment and transmitter of his or her destiny” (Gyekye 1995, 97). Thus, whereas 
Wiredu endorses the communality of personhood, Gyekye rejects the notion of a 
socially determined and perhaps (though not necessarily) a narrative self, and could 
argue that the narrative is nothing more than the flowering out of the self as 
constructed before birth. 
So, we are able to see the differences between Wiredu’s and Gyekye’s 
interpretations of the ōkra in the Akan tradition. Now, while Gyekye is relatively 
silent as to the divisions of the honam (body), Wiredu introduces a particular aspect 
of the honam that may be beneficial to understanding the social nature of personal 
identity (as it relates to questions of characterization). Wiredu tells us that the body is 
thought to be composed of the mogya, or the human’s blood. For the Akan, on 
Wiredu’s interpretation, the mogya, in making up the physical blood of the human, is 
thought to be the matrilineal identity passed on to the human. Wiredu tells us that: 
“Since the Akans are matrilineal people, it is the kinship status that situates a person 
in the most visceral relationships and brings him into the most existential of the 
networks of obligations, rights, and privileges that characterize Akan communalism” 
(Wiredu 1997, 50). What Wiredu has in mind here is that the agent’s mother’s 
ancestral identity passes on to the agent, and society recognizes this identity when 
engaging the agent. The blood that the agent has will frame part of an agent’s identity 
insofar as society will recognize him/her in a certain way because of his/her maternal 
lineage. What we can take from this is that a human has constraints placed on his/her 
identity even before he/she is born. Consider Wiredu again, when speaking not only 
of the mogya but also the sumsum:  
 
Both the maternal and paternal contributions to the person are bases of membership in 
specific social units. Akans are matrilineal; therefore, the blood principle [Mogya] 
situates a person in the important kinship units, namely, the lineage or, more extensively, 
the clan. Through the charisma principle [Sumsum] one belongs to a grouping on the 
father’s side that is largely ceremonial but also a framework for much goodwill. The 
point now is this: on Akan showing, a person [understood here as merely a human] has a 
well-structured social identity even before birth (Wiredu 1992b, 85). 
 
For the Akan, identity has a social aspect to it that determines the type of identity 
each human will take, even before personhood is achieved. Your community will 
determine how you are able to construct your identity, insofar as it will set parameters 
                                                
2 Perhaps a better way to think of it is that the sumsum is the capacity of the okra to think, desire, feel, 
imagine, etc. It would not be two different entities, but one entity with a certain power that we give a 
different name to (potentially to differentiate the types of existing okra). 
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within which identities can be constructed before your birth. These parameters situate 
you; they are necessary and sufficient conditions for the possibility of there being a 
“you.” These will be parameters that you, no matter how much you rebel, will 
respond to and struggle with but never get outside of. You will use them to cultivate 
yourself and determine other human’s identities by preserving or reworking them. 
Here we are able to see features of identity that should not be overlooked, namely 
that we are born to certain people, and with certain features. Now, we as Westerners 
may not place very much stock on the idea that we have our identities transposed into 
us by our parents blood and semen. Still, I think that we can appreciate what the Akan 
suggest when we think consider that we do get particular proclivities and 
psychological traits such as predispositions to Alzheimer’s, schizophrenia, mental 
acuities, etc. and biological makeups such as skin color, susceptibility to particular 
health conditions, etc. from our ancestry. These will in some sense determine the 
parameters of our identities, and though we may struggle with them, they of necessity 
participate in what we take to characterize ourselves. The person who has a history of 
schizophrenia in his/her family will form a particular conception of self, and a 
particular narrative in light of this history. He/she might set out to better understand 
schizophrenia by becoming a doctor, or may develop neurotic tendencies due to 
anxiety that he/she will be affected by schizophrenia. This history sets the parameters 
of this person’s identity, and are woven through his/her narrative. How he/she 
responds to this history is to be explained by other social constraints and parameters 
operating around and within him/her. 
Moreover, we cannot ignore that who we are born to, as well as what physical 
features we have, matter insofar as we will be recognized in our social communities 
for having these features. Our communities confer a type of value to our family 
names, medical conditions, and basic physical features in a manner that determines 
our identities. For example, W.E.B. Du Bois made the famous appeal to “double 
consciousness” as what principally informs black identity at the turn of the twentieth-
century (Du Bois 2003, 9). This identity-marker is only possible if one is socially 
recognized for having particular physical traits that have a particular value in 
community that does not depend on the individual or any “spontaneous” acts of the 
will. Our bodies matter insofar as they are given a particular value in society.  
Thus, there seems to be a problem with Schechtman’s thinking on personal 
identity. Schechtman argues that an answer to the characterization question requires 
the support of a psychological theory in which answers the reidentification question. 
Yet, it appears to be the case that she fails to appreciate how bodies affect psyches, 
and are affected by social value, such that societies determine how bodies are valued, 
which determines possible psychological characteristics and the potential ways in 
which these characteristics are developed––that is to say, which psychological 
characteristics a person can/will have. So, let us say that characteristics are 
psychological, and thus that the characterization question is answered only by being 
undergirded by a psychological continuity theory. However, it appears to be the case 
that one cannot explain psyches without appeal to bodies. We have certain 
psychological characteristics because of the types of bodies that we have. Now, it 
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would appear that a part of the reason why bodies are able to influence our psyches is 
because they have a certain sort of value. The value that is placed on an individual’s 
body affects the type of psyche that the individual has. Yet, we cannot explain the 
value of our bodies, as they relate to our psychological development, without appeal 
to our communities. Communities determine the value of our bodies, and this 
determination is responsible for the psychological states that characterize our personal 
identity. As a result, we cannot explain what characterizes an individual without the 
determination of the community in conferring a value to the bodies that determine the 
physical features that we have.  
Who we are born to—the genes and bodies that we have—matter in determining 
who we are, and communities make bodies and genes meaningful insofar as they 
determine the value of these physical traits. This determination affects what identities 
we take. Thus, community is a necessary component in the determination of personal 
identity, insofar as it determines both the value of the bodies that we form narratives 
with, and the parameters of the narrative that make up individual identity. So, it 
would appear that our social communities, in being the sources of our biological 
makeups and giving value to our bodies and biological makeups, play a larger role 
than what must merely be synched with the individual narrative so that the individual 
can live the life of a person. If we take Wiredu seriously, we understand that the 
narratives that are our identities begin with our communities even before we are born, 
and that our communities value features beyond our control that will determine what 
characterizes us. 
There is one final idea expressed by the Akan that I would like to discuss, and it is 
this idea that I believe best illustrates the social nature of personal identity, namely 
the Akan conception of personhood as an achievement. Now, it would be beneficial 
to begin by stating that much of the controversy surrounding the human/person 
distinction, along with the conception of what a human being is, regards language. 
Among the Akan, the word for both human and person is onipa (Wiredu 1992a, 104). 
One might suppose, as Gyekye does, that the Akan conceptualized the person and the 
human as being inseparable, and thus to speak of a human is to speak of a person, and 
vice versa (perhaps because of the divine spark) (Wiredu and Gyekye 1992). Still, 
like Wiredu, one might think that Gyekye fails to capture certain usages of the term 
that seem to add something to the ordinary conception. Considering Wiredu, who tells 
us the following story: 
 
In 1979, President Kaunda of Zambia gave high praise to then Prime Minister of Britain, 
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, for her unexpected constructiveness during the last series of 
negotiations that led to the termination of white minority rule in Zimbabwe. He said that 
she was ‘truly a person,’ and he immediately provided a key to this choice of words…. 
On this showing, the ‘Iron Lady’ received very high marks indeed. The semantics of 
personhood in the language of the Zambians is similar to the semantics of personhood 
accepted by the Akans of Ghana and the Ivory Coast (Wiredu 1992a, 104). 
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President Kaunda’s use of “person” seems to diverge from the ordinary usage 
insofar as it seems to add significance to Thatcher’s humanity. Why point out that 
Thatcher is a human being when honoring her for some achievement? President 
Kaunda seems to use the term in an elevated sense, suggesting that Thatcher has 
achieved some level of excellence or has achieved something that needed to be 
publicly recognized. Thus, Wiredu concludes that for the Akan, personhood is 
something that a human being achieves through a certain type of action in 
community.  
On Wiredu’s account, personhood is achieved when an individual human being 
achieves certain notable successes and performs particular rights, social duties, and 
moral obligations that are relative to their individual starting-points. Wiredu tells us 
that: “In Akan thinking, as indeed in the thinking of many other African peoples, a 
person in the true sense is not just any human being, but one who has attained the 
status of a responsible member of society” (Wiredu 1997, 51). Further, Wiredu tells 
us that “personhood is not an automatic quality of the human individual; personhood 
is something to be achieved, and the higher the achievement, the higher the credit” 
(Wiredu 1992a, 104). So, in addition to personhood being something that humans 
strive towards, Wiredu thinks that for the Akan there are degrees of personhood such 
that an individual can achieve different levels of personhood. “In the path of 
improvement, there are, theoretically, endless vistas of higher personhood” (Wiredu 
1997, 51). For Wiredu, personhood is a multileveled achievement, or a sort of honor 
conferred onto a human being for performing and upholding particular duties and 
moral obligations. 
One potential problem with this view is that it may lead to inequalities in 
treatment of individuals, such that some members of the community may not be 
respected. And this may create an inequality in the distribution of goods that 
determines one’s ability to flourish economically or in abilities to act morally, and 
thus in the possibilities of becoming persons. If this were the case, then the 
conception of personhood as an achievement would be a privileged term, insofar as 
one would have to begin in a privileged position to have the possibility of achieving 
personhood. Gyekye expresses a worry like this one. For Gyekye, the Akan are 
fundamentally committed to human rights, and as such they cannot conceptualize 
there being levels of personhood, insofar as their commitment to human rights could 
then be called into question (Wiredu and Gyekye 1992, 152).  
In response to this type of objection Wiredu argues that the Akan commitment to 
human rights is still preserved insofar as the Akan conception of personhood as an 
achievement is open-ended, but only on one side. Wiredu thinks that there are levels 
of personhood that extend indefinitely. Still, he argues that one can never sink below 
the level of humanity. All humans are equal, insofar as all humans have an ōkra. In 
this way, all humans are entitled to respect as humans. Even still, one might be 
awarded a particular level of recognition in accordance with achievements and moral 
activity. We may better understand this difference by looking at Stephen Nathanson’s 
division of types of desert. Nathonson tells us that there is personal desert, whereby 
someone deserves a certain type of treatment or level of respect because of what 
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he/she has done. He contrasts personal desert with human desert, whereby someone 
deserves treatment or a level of respect irrespective of what he/she has done 
(Nathanson 2001, 139). With regard to Wiredu, one would deserve a basic level of 
human respect because of the ōkra (or the type of ōkra) that was placed into them, 
and would deserve this respect irrespective of any achievements. However, once they 
have achieved a level of personhood, they would deserve a level of respect based on 
their actions in community. 
Now, this may or may not solve the problem. One might still think that 
personhood, as conceived in this way, will affect how one is treated as a human being 
as well as one’s ability to achieve personhood, making it easier for some than for 
others. Moreover, one might question the political nature of this process, such that 
heroic actions fail to be recognized, and thus some humans might not be accorded 
personhood status because of the political commitments of their communities. To 
offer a defense of the Akan, this critique points to the very political nature of human 
beings and human actions. The value of our actions will always be interpreted in the 
light of our communities’ politics. Critiquing this notion of personhood and the 
treatment of humans on these grounds would not carry anymore weight than 
critiquing how we value particular figures in history because their views express our 
own political commitments. In any event, the Akan conception of personhood as an 
achievement can be useful insofar as it allows us to more clearly see the social nature 
of individual identity through its depiction of the ways in which social recognition 
has an effect on one’s self-image, and can even show us that our ability to re-identify 
with our past actions is possible only through social community.  
Wiredu’s interpretation of the Akan conception of personhood allows us to see the 
impact that communities have on identity because it implicates the ways in which 
communities affect which narratives become important for us to have. What I mean 
here is that social recognition is what is most important to our self-images, and we 
will go to great lengths to obtain it. Crafting our identities (constructing our 
narratives) so as to be accepted socially is the primary way that we cultivate positive 
self-images. For the Akan, personhood is a type of social recognition that individuals 
strive for and are granted because of particular actions enacted and lives led in 
community. What we can take from this is that communities determine the value of 
individual actions and lives insofar as they grant this status that individuals desire as 
they pursue positive self-images. Because individuals strive to achieve social 
recognition, we can infer that individuals place a premium on being socially 
recognized when individuals carve out identities for themselves. An individual will 
not carve out an identity that is not intended to produce social recognition. It is wrong 
to think that we carve out identities so that we will be happy, irrespective of our 
communities. A community recognizing us in a certain sort of way is what makes us 
happy, and is the reason we are concerned to construct certain narratives. In fact, 
social recognition is the reason why we desire others to reconstruct (re-narrate) our 
lives in particular ways. In this way, we are able to see that social communities 
determine our identity insofar as we carve them out in order to achieve a recognition 
that can only be granted in community. This phenomenon does not merely regard the 
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Akan; it is merely the case that the Akan conception of personhood helps us to see it 
more clearly. 
It is easily noticed that for the Akan, personhood depends on social recognition; 
we may say that for the Akan, personhood as achievement is a type of social 
recognition. And because personhood depends on social recognition, one may infer 
that if personhood is important to an individual, then social recognition will be 
important to him/her. In fact personhood, as a type of recognition, cannot be 
unimportant to an individual because of his/her social nature. Even if personhood is 
not granted by those with the greatest amount of political power in the community, an 
agent seeks an “equivalent” type of recognition from a less powerful community.3  
Now, if social recognition has the importance to the individual that I claim that it 
does, then the narrative that he/she attempts to carve out for him/herself will be for 
the purpose of receiving this social recognition, insofar as he/she attempts to 
incorporate socially accepted norms and values into the life that he/she lives. The 
reason for this, again, is that his/her positive self-image, in being inseparably linked 
to what others think or know about him/her, is linked to social recognition. Consider 
Wiredu when he writes about the link between social recognition, self-images, and 
identity: “Indeed, one of the most agonizing moments in the life of an Akan is being 
constrained to ask, ‘Am I ever going to become a person?’ This is a supreme moment 
of self-questioning that can, in some cases, have a transforming effect” (Wiredu 
1992a, 108). Here we are able to see the intimate connection between one’s self-
image and the achievement of personhood as a type of social recognition. And as 
such, we are able to see the intimate connection between identity and social 
recognition. Failing to receive social recognition in the form of the achievement of 
personhood can cause an existential crisis, and this allows us to see the impact that 
social recognition, as accorded to us by our communities, has on identity. Not only is 
the individual depicted here as having what we may term an “identity-crisis,” which, 
for Schechtman, regards the fundamental issue of characterization, but we are able to 
see the desire for social recognition determining what identity the individual thinks 
he/she ought to have in a way that affects his/her self-image, and thus has a capacity 
to alter features that characterize the individual. 
So, we are able to see the connection between narratives and social recognition. 
Now, if an individual’s narrative is inseparably linked to social recognition, such that 
his/her narrative will be constructed in accordance with a desire to be recognized in a 
certain sort of way by his/her community, then it seems that we are licensed to infer 
that the individual’s community determines his/her narrative. More than simply 
synching up with his/her narrative, and perhaps even more than simply determining 
the parameters of the narrative (as has been demonstrated above with the use of the 
components of the Akan conception of the human being), his/her community defines 
                                                
3  This explains people’s attempts to construct narrative identities against particular mainstream 
political values, leading them to become members of cliques, gangs, and terrorist groups. Thus, 
ultimately I am not arguing that there is a static type of social recognition conferred by a political 
community. As will become clear, there are different sub-communities within a larger political 
community that confer social recognition. 
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the type of narrative that he/she desires to have, and ultimately will construct because 
of his/her desire for recognition. In fact, it would appear that his/her community is 
itself responsible for him/her having a desire to for characteristics that form an 
identity. 
One may question how it is possible to ask such an existentially probing question 
if communities determining identity. In other words, how can this existential crisis be 
the result of not achieving social recognition when the desire to achieve social 
recognition is determining the type of narrative that I construct, and thus the type of 
identity-characteristics that I have? How can the individual having the existential 
crisis be affected by an identity that he/she ought to have, but does not have, if social 
recognition determines the identity that he/she does have? My answer is that, when 
looking at Wiredu’s statement, it would appear that he is simply taking the dominant 
political community to be that in which confers this social recognition onto an 
individual. We may understand the existential (identity) crisis as a realization by the 
individual having the crisis that he/she has failed to accept the values of the dominant 
political community when constructing his/her narrative, and not that his/her identity 
was not constructed so as to achieve social recognition from any community 
whatsoever. The existential crisis is the result of realizing that the “wrong” 
community has determined who the individual is (what characterizes the individual).  
Thus, my argument here is not that the dominant political community, or even one 
community completely determines individual identity. One may think of the 
relationship between the individual and his/her social community as it relates to 
identity as a push/pull relationship, and the relationship between communities as it 
relates to the identity of individuals in the same light. There is social influence on 
identity from the very beginning, insofar as one’s community determines the 
parameters of individual identity prior to his/her birth. As the individual grows, 
he/she might accept those parameters and attempt to work towards the social 
recognition of that community—he/she might construct a narrative in line with the 
values that his/her community has setup for him/her. The individual might also reject 
either parts or the whole of the community’s values, seeking recognition from another 
community. However, at no time is a community not in some sense pressing on the 
individual in his/her narrative-construction. And at no time is the individual’s identity 
not being defined by a community’s recognition that he/she desires for a positive self-
image. Communities are crafting the individual as the individual is crafting 
him/herself to the liking of a community. 
Let’s look at an example of this. Say we have person A (call him Joseph) and 
Person B (call him Jack). Both Joseph and Jack were born in a highly conservative 
(define it however you wish) community (Community1) and thus have had the 
parameters of their individual identities defined for them prior to birth. Joseph accepts 
his social community and thus attempts to be recognized by his community. In the 
Akan sense, Joseph seeks personhood within this community. Jack, on the other hand, 
rejects the conservative community (Community1) and begins to construct his identity 
around a liberal community (Community2). Looking at Jack’s narrative, it would not 
be right to think that because Jack rejects Community1, a community is not 
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determining his identity. It would be right to think that Community1 and Community2 
are determining Jack’s narrative even after Jack rejects Community1. Jack is 
responding to (rejecting) his conservative community, which means that Jack is not 
simply a leaf blown in the wind insofar as the social nature of his individual identity 
is concerned. There is a push/pull relationship, and thus we might think that there is 
some “freedom” in his attempt to construct his identity. Still, it would be wrong to 
think that the conservative community does not determine Jack’s identity even after 
he rejects it. In his rejection, he consciously attempts to act so as not to embrace the 
values of Community1, which evidences its determination on him.4 Further, as is 
evident, it would be wrong to think that no social community is determining Jack’s 
identity after he rejects his conservative social community. He seeks recognition from 
a liberal community. And thus, his identity is at each moment being determined by 
these communities in his attempts to both distance himself from, and be recognized 
by, a community. 
Now, it is not merely the case that social communities define individuals without 
individuals being able to redefine the content of the parameters that will shape others 
within these communities. Recall that individuals’ identity is socially determined 
from the very beginning of individuals’ lives, which is to say that communities 
determine the parameters of individuals’ identities prior to their births. Recall also 
that some individuals will accept their communities’ values. Others from these 
communities will reject certain of their communal values, so long as there are no 
absolute constraints on the individual. What I am suggesting here is that the rejection 
of a community’s values is contingent on there being access to different values and/or 
models of social life. If there is access to different values or models of social life, and 
individuals reject their communities’ values, then these persons are able to rethink the 
values that do and will define other individuals. The rejection of the communal values 
is a response to individuals’ exposure to different values and either individuals being 
rejected from certain of the communities’ social practices/benefits or individuals’ 
recognition that the values of the community are deficient in some way. 
Let us see an example of this. Recall our example of the conservatism of Jack and 
Joseph. Recall that Jack rejected his conservative community (Community1) in favor 
of a liberal community (Community2). Recall also that both communities are in some 
sense determining Jack even after his rejection of Community1. According to the 
argument that I have just set forth, Jack will have needed to be exposed to a separate 
set of values (those embraced by Community2) and either will have been rejected 
from certain of the communities social practices/benefits or will have recognized a 
deficiency of particular values held by those within Community1. Perhaps Jack was 
led to reject Community1 because he is of a particular race that was excluded from 
access to certain social goods because of his race, or perhaps he had a particular 
sexual orientation around which oppressive values were constructed. Jack may have 
                                                
4 One can perhaps think of the transgendered person who no longer identifies as male. In the very 
statement, “I no longer (do not) identify as male,” masculinity is still informing her identity because it 
is certain that her actions are consciously made so as not to be masculine. 
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recognized certain sexist values within the community even if he was not a member 
of the sex who was harmed by those values. After having been exposed to 
Community2’s values and having rejected Community1’s values, Jack might attempt 
to influence the parameters set by Community1 by attempting to infuse more of 
Community2’s values into Community1. He may feel obligated to do so from a 
perceived duty to his family or posterity, or perhaps he is driven by patriotism or 
thoughts that many of the values of the community ought to be preserved. In this way, 
he might attempt to preserve conservative values that are taken to be adequate and 
reform other conservative values that are taken to be oppressive.  
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
What I present here is neither a complete endorsement of the Akan conception of 
personhood as an achievement that is given to us by Wiredu nor the general notion of 
humanity that is presented by either Wiredu or Gyekye. There are many reasons to 
worry about these conceptions. Personally, I take them to be very rich conceptions 
that I do not share. However, this is not to suggest that there is nothing in Western 
cultures that do not liken to the Akan conceptions, particularly personhood as an 
achievement. Terms such as “real woman” (to distinguish a female achieving moral 
and social maturity as opposed to an immature adult female) are used in many 
African American communities and sang about by artists like Mary J. Blige. 
Conceptions like “real woman” seem to be comparable to the Akan conception of 
personhood. Moreover, I do think that by viewing them, we can begin to understand 
the deeply social nature of individual identity. To answer the question, “who am I” is 
to have a narrative, and to have a narrative not only involves a social community in 
my engagements, but involves a social community determining the value of those 
engagements, recognizing me in a certain way for those engagements, and providing 
the descriptive and normative grounds for my future projects while giving me every 
possible project to which I aspire. 
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